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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME XXII JUNE, 1937 NUMBER 4
CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY BETWEEN
TORTFEASORS*
FRANCIS H. BOHLEN
II. INDEMNITY
The writer has already stated his opinion that one of the unfortunate results
of the denial of the right to contribution between joint and co-tortfeasors has
been the overallowance of indemnity in cases in which there is no great dis-
parity between their responsibility. There are of course certain situations in
which it is obviously proper to allow indemnity. The first is where the
person against whom recovery is had is without personal fault, his liability
being based upon his purely vicarious responsibility for the conduct of the
person who has conducted himself tortiously. The most salient instance of
this vicarious responsibility is, of course, that which is attached to the rela-
tion of master and servant. No one has doubted that a master who has been
forced to pay damages because of the misconduct of a carefully selected
servant is entitled to indemnity from such servant.' This, however, is not
the only situation in which vicarious responsibility is imposed upon a per-
fectly innocent defendant and wherever there is such responsibility the right
of indemnity should follow.
The decisions in the English cases go so far as to make it practically im-
possible for one who has work to be done which can only be performed with
safety to third persons by the exercise of positive care and competence to
escape liability by trusting its performance to an independent contractor. 2
There are some American states,2' though unfortunately too few, which more
*The first installment of this article appeared in (1936) 21 CORNELL L. Q. 552.
'Among the numerous cases so holding are Smith v. Foran, 43 Conn. 244 (1875);
Va. So. & Fla. Ry. v. Jossey, 105 Va. 271, 31 S. E. 179 (1898) ; Grand Trunk Ry. v.
Latham, 63 Me. 177 (1874); Fedden v. Brooklyn Eastern Dist. Terminal, 204 App.
Div. 741, 199 N. Y. Supp. 9 (2d Dept. 1923); see Betcher v. McChesney, 255 Pa.
394, 100 At. 124 (1917).
-See opinion by A. L. Smith, L. J., in Holliday v. Nat. Tel. Co., L. R. [1899] 2 Q. B.
392 at 400.
"For instance, Covington Bridge Co. v. Steinbrock, 61 Ohio St. 215 (1899), and
Boylhart v. DiMarco & Reimann, 270 N. Y. 217, 200 N. E. 793 (1936), with which
compare the earlier Engle v. Eureka Club, 137 N. Y. 100, 32 N. E. 1052 (1893).
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or less closely approximate the English law.3 In such jurisdictions one who
becomes liable, because of the failure of the contractor to exercise that care
and competence necessary for the performance of what perhaps may be prop-
erly called dangerous work, should be and is entitled to indemnity from the
contractor through whose fault, or that of his servant, liability has been
brought to the employer.4 These, however, are not the only situations in
which there is vicarious responsibility. A merchant who puts out under his
own name a product made for him by a manufacturer is, in several juris-
dictions, held liable under such conditions as would make the manufacturer
liable if he sold under his own name. Statutes have been passed in many
states which make the registered owner of a car responsible for the care-
less manner in which it is driven by anyone whom he permits to drive it.
So far as the writer knows, no cases have been brought which have required
the court to determine whether the merchant or registered owner could
recover indemnity from the manufacturer or licensee. However, since the
right to indemnity in the master-servant, employer-independent contractor
relation is based upon the vicarious character of the master or employer's
liability, it seems inevitable that a right of indemnity should be allowed. 5
'Pfau v. Williamson, 63 Il1. 16 (1872); Eluyer v. Benevolent Ass'n Elks, 152 La.
73, 92 So. 739 (1922) (where the contract contained a provision giving the employer
the right to terminate in the event that the contractor failed to comply with the speci-
fications and stipulations of the contract) ; Hailfinger v. Meyer, 215 App. Div. 35, 212 N.
Y. Supp. 746 (4th Dept. 1925) (motion to join contractor as an additional defendant
liable over to employer granted); Maxwell, Saulspaw & Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R.,
1 Tenn. Ch. 8 (1872); Kampman v. Rothwell, 101 Tex. 535, 109 S. W. 1089 (1908);
cf. Scott v. Curtis, 195 N. Y. 424, 88 N. E. 794 (1909). In Robbins v. Chicago, 4
Wall. 657 (U. S. 1866), a municipality recovered indemnity from an owner who em-
ployed an independent contractor to make excavations in a sidewalk. And in Phoenix
Bridge Co. v. Creem, 102 App. Div. 354, 92 N. Y. Supp. 855 (2d Dept. 1905), aff'd,
w.o. op., 185 N. Y. 580, 78 N. E. 1110 (1906), a general contractor recovered over from
a subcontractor who negligently left unguarded on the sidewalk a heap of stones and
dirt. The same reasons for permitting an owner to recover over from a general con-
tractor for whose negligence he has been forced to pay damrnages avail where the general
contractor is required to make compensation for harm caused by his independent sub-
contractor. Cf. Geo. A. Fuller Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 245 U. S. 489, 38 Sup. Ct. 180
(1918).
'While in one state, at least, an automobile may not be operated without insurance
against liability due to careless driving, in practically every other state every owner
of a car who has sufficient assets reachable by an execution does, in fact, take out
insurance.
'There is more than little reason to believe that the introduction of liability insurance
has had a very real effect upon tort law, although in the writer's opinion too little effect
has been given to it. For example, it is doubtful whether the extreme revulsion against
holding an employer of an independent contractor liable for the manner in which his con-
tractor does even such work as requires peculiar care and skill would have been greatly
lessened had liability insurance been available when the original decisions were rendered.
So long as the personal assets of the employer would necessarily be depleted by a judg-
ment entered against him, there was perhaps reason to regard it as unfair to impose so
possibly a ruinous burden upon him. Today, one who employs a contractor can
assure himself of the latter's solvency and, therefore, that his right of indemnity
will be effective by requiring the contractor to produce evidence that he carries
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The effect and, it may be assumed, the object of such statutes is to make the
insurance, which whether required by statute or not is almost universally
taken out by those registered owners who have assets reachable by execution,
available to those who are injured by the possibly irresponsible persons
whom the owner permits to drive his car.6 The claimant's right to indemnity
in all of these cases depends upon the vicarious character of the responsi-
bility and does not extend to cases in which his liability is based in whole or
in part upon his personal fault. In such case, his right to indemnity, if
any, must be placed upon grounds similar to those upon which one of two
actual wrongdoers is permitted to recover against another if the other's
misconduct is in kind, and not in degree only, more culpable than that of
the -plaintiff.
There is another situation in which there is every reason for the universal
recognition of the right to indemnity. .That is where the defendant has
directed or commanded the claimant to deal on his behalf with lands or
chattels in such a manner as to constitute an unlawful invasion of the pos-
sessory or proprietary interest of a third person therein or, to put it in the
conventional legal terms, to constitute a trespass or conversion. If the
claimant obeys the direction or command, justifiably relying upon it as an
assurance that the defendant has a right or privilege which will make his,
the claimant's, conduct lawful, he is entitled to indemnity from the defendant
for such damages as he lawfully may be required to pay together with the
cost of defending any action brought against him.
One of the usual instances of this allowance of indemnity is where the
defendant directs his servant or employs an independent contractor to cut
timber or erect a building on a third person's land or otherwise to deal with
it in a way justifiable only if done by its possessor or with his consent. In
such case, the servant or contractor, in the absence of very good reason to
know the contrary, is entitled to assume that the defendant is the owner or
has some authority from the owner which gives him the privilege to have
the act done and to delegate the exercise of that privilege to the claimant.7
Not only is the claimant entitled to treat the direction as such an assurance,
but as between himself and the defendant he is not required to make a care-
adequate insurance. Similarly, before liability insurance was available, to make the
employer substantially a guarantor of the solvency of his contractor, as would be the
case if vicarious responsibility were imposed, would work hardship upon the small and
lightly financed contractor. Employers would naturally select those contractors whose
assets were sufficient to afford them reasonable security through indemnity. Here again
a small contractor can at a fairly moderate cost take out insurance which makes his
employment entirely safe.8Itfra note 41.
r-orrabin v. City Des Moines, 198 Iowa 549, 199 N. W. 988 (1924); Drummond v.
Humphreys, 39 Me. 347 (1855); Avery v. Halsey, 14 Pick. 174 (Mass. 1833); see
Little v. Robert G. Lassiter & Co., 156 S. C. 286, 153 S. E. 128 (1930).
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ful examination of the facts or to form a competent judgment upon such facts
as are known to him. He is not deprived of his right of indemnity unless
he knows that the defendant has no right or privilege, or at the most that
the facts so clearly indicate their absence that no man of even the most
ordinary intelligence would misinterpret them. Indeed, mere notice of the
third person's claim does not require him to investigate its validity.8
So, too, indemnity is allowed to a claimant who similarly relies upon the
defendant's direction as an assurance of a right or privilege which would
justify such dealings with a chattel as otherwise would clearly be an inva-
sion of any outstanding interest which a third person might have to its
immediate possession and which, therefore, toward such person would amount
to a conversion. If, in pursuance of such a direction, he becomes a con-
verter, he is entitled to indemnity.9 Here again there is no reason to inves-
tigate or form a reasonably competent judgment upon facts known. Only
the knowledge of the absence of a privilege in the defendant or facts which
would make such absence obvious to the meanest intelligence can deprive
him of his right to indemnity. Thus, if the defendant has a writ which
authorizes him to take the property of another and directs an officer serving
it to take specified goods of a third person as the goods of him against whom
the writ is directed, the officer is entitled to indemnity.1 0 This is so even
though the claimant knows that the third person has laid claim to the goods
in question. 1
No case has been found in which a claimant who has made himself liable
to a third person by following directions or commands of the defendant or
acting upon his permission has been allowed indemnity except where the
claimant's belief in the lawfulness of his act was due to his justifiable reli-
ance upon the authority of the defendant to give the direction or grant the
permission; in other words, the justifiable belief that the defendant had a
delegable privilege to do that which he commanded or permitted the claim-
ant to do. In all but a very few cases' 2 in which the right of indemnity
'Avery v. Halsey, 14 Pick. 174 (Mass. 1833) ; cf. Cox v. Cameron Lumber Co., 39
Wash. 562, 82 Pac. 116 (1905).
'Higgins v. Russo, 72 Conn. 238, 43 At. 1050 (1899) ; Selz, Schwab & Co. v. Guth-
man, 62 Ill. App. 624 (1896) ; Gower v. Emery, 18 Me. 79 (1841) ; Hoggan v. Cahoon,
26 Utah 444, 73 Pac. 512 (1903).
"
0Higgins v. Russo, 72 Conn. 238, 43 AtI. 1050 (1899) ; Selz, Schwab & Co. v. Guth-
man, 62 I1. App. 624 (1896); Gower v. Emery, 18 Me. 79 (1841). However, where
the officer is not directed to levy on specific goods he is not entitled to indemnity if he
executes the writ on the wrong goods and thereby subjects himself to liability. Nelson
v. Cook, 17 Ill. 443 (1856) ; Russell v. Walker, 150 Mass. 531, 23 N. E. 383 (1890)
Wilson v. Milner, 2 Camp. 452 (Eng. 1810).
'Higgins v. Russo, 72 Conn. 238, 43 At. 1050 (1899).
"In Fletcher v. Harcot, Hutton 55 (1622), it was held that an innkeeper who made
himself liable to a third person by detaining him at the command of a sheriff, who
falsely asserted that he had a writ against such third person, could recover on an express
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has been sustained under these circumstances, the claimant had invaded a
third person's possessory or proprietary interest in lands or chattels with
which the claimant dealt, and it is in these cases in which the reliance of
the claimant is most obviously justifiable. The actions of trespass quare
clausumn fregit and de bonis asportatis, and trover, by which the liability for
such invasions was enforced under strict common law pleading, though in
form actions of tort, are in substance actions to vindicate the possessory
or proprietary interest of which the plaintiff therein is deprived by giving
him the money equivalent of the interests in the land or goods which he has
lost. This is admirably brought out in Lord Mansfield's classical description
of the action of trover: "The action of trover [is] in form a fiction and in
substance founded on property for the equitable purpose of recovering the
value of the plaintiff's specific property used and enjoyed by the defendant."' 3
One dealing in a manner derogatory to any possible proprietary interest
does so at the risk that his honest and well-founded belief in the lawfulness
of his conduct may prove erroneous. The extreme severity of this liability
makes it essential that those who take such risk at the direction of another
may look to the other for protection if they thereby incur liability.1 4
Both where the claimant deals with land at the direction or command of
the defendant and where he similarly deals with chattels, it is entirely imma-
terial that the defendant himself honestly believed that he had the power
to confer a privilege which would make the claimant's dealing with the land
or chattel lawful. The right to indemnity is not based upon the defendant's
fault, either of conscious misrepresentation or unreasonable ignorance of
promise of indemnity, for the reason that "he which doth a thing which may be lawfull,
and the illegality thereof appear not to him, he which imploys the party and assume to
save him harmlesse, shall be charged." It is probable that even without the promise
indemnity might be allowed in such case. In another case, Howe v. Buffalo etc. R. R., 37
N. Y. 297 (1867), the claimant, a conductor employed by the defendant railway company,
put a passenger off the train in compliance with the instruction of the company to
receive no ticket issued more than six days before the transportation. In such case it
seems entirely proper that a subordinate should not be required to inquire into the
legality of the rules which his superior asserts he has been permitted to make. Cf.
Culmer v. Wilson, 13 Utah 129, 44 Pac. 833 (1896).
"Hambly v. Trott, Cowper 371 (1776) *at p. 374.
"Curiously enough, no case has been found in which the right to indemnity has been
asserted where the claimant relied upon the permission of an apparent owner or possessor
of land or chattels as an assurance that he may on his own behalf deal with it in the
permitted way. There seems to be, however, no good reason why indemnity should not
be allowed in such case. It would seem that the claimant should be as much entitled to
rely upon the defendant's consent as an assurance of his power to give it as he is
customarily held entitled to rely upon the defendant's direction or command. The re-
quest for permission shows that the claimant believed that the defendant, by ownership
or consent of the possessor, had authority to give it. The defendant knows that the
effect of giving such consent will lead the claimant into action which if the defendant's
authority is lacking will subject the claimant to liability. The mere fact that the act is
not done for the purpose or benefit of the defendant ought not to be sufficient to bar
indemnity.
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the extent of his rights and privileges, but upon the claimant's justifiable
belief in the power of the defendant to give a lawful command or permission.
There is a strong social justification for the claimant's right to rely, as
between himself and the defendant, on the defendant's command or even
permission as assurance that his act will be legal. Title to land or goods
is often exceedingly obscure. Nonetheless, one who has a bona fide belief
in the validity of his title would be gravely hampered in his use of his land
or chattel if those whom he commands or permits to deal with it could not
look to him for protection.
These considerations, which make it proper to hold one dealing with land or
chattels at the command or permission of another is entitled to rely upon the
command or permission as an assurance that, the dealings will not subject
him to liability, do not apply to conduct which is tortious because, under cir-
cumstances as to which the defendant has not misled the claimant, it
threatens harm to interests other than those which are possessory or pro-
prietary as, for example, the interest which every man has in his bodily
security.
The interest in bodily security has not the sacrosanct character which the
law ascribes to possessory or proprietary interests in lands or goods. There
is no element such as title which is often substantially unknowable, save by
an investigation which, indeed, might prove futile. There is, therefore, no
danger that, unless indemnity were granted, proper commands or directions
would be disregarded through fear of liability. Therefore, unless the claim-
ant has been misled by the defendant as to some fact upon which the
propriety of his conduct depends, he cannot rely upon the judgment of the
defendant as a justification for believing thai the commanded act can law-
fully be done.15 The circumstances.being known, every man must judge for
himself as to what is necessary for him to do or to leave undone in order
to a'roid injury to the physical safety of others. He is, therefore, not entitled
to assume that an act recognizable by reasonable men as dangerous to the
physical security of another may lawfully be done because a third person
has directed him to do it. It is not impossible to imagine a case in which
the defendant has by word or other conduct misrepresented to the claimant
that circumstances exist which would give the defendant a privilege to act
"In Plasikowski v. Arbus, 92 Conn. 556, 103 Atl. 642 (1918), the claimant, as chauf-
feur, at the defendant's instructions operated his automobile knowing that the brakes
were in a defective condition. He was held not entitled to indemnity from his master
for expenses incurred in defending himself in a prosecution for reckless driving arising
out of his striking and injuring a third person. Cf. Percy v. Clary, 32 Md. 245 (1869)(claimant forced to pay damages for forcible ejectment) ; Attain v. Johnson, 43 Vt. 78
(1870) (claimant published article libelous on its face at the request of defendant. The
court denied indemnity though there was an express promise by the defendant to save
the plaintiff harmless).
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in a manner which, but for them, would be unreasonably dangerous. A
claimant who is thus misled into a course of action, tortious because the
circumstances do not exist, may well be entitled to indemnity. For example,
it is generally held that a police officer is privileged when in pursuit of a
criminal to drive in a manner which otherwise would be negligent or even
recldess.16 This privilege has been held to be delegable to a motorist whose car
is commandeered for such a purpose by a police officer. 17  The difficulty,
however, is in finding any liability which would attach to the car owner who
reasonably believes that the police officer is in pursuit of a bandit. His
privilege to accede to the police officer's request is like the majority of
privileges based not upon the actual facts but upon the facts, which he
reasonably believes to exist. In both these situations it seems obviously
proper that the claimant should be permitted to transfer to the defendant
the entire burden of the liability into which his vicarious responsibility for
the defendant's misconduct has imposed upon him or which he had incurred
in reasonable reliance upon the defendant's power to authorize his actions.
There is another situation in which the indemnity is allowed because the
claimant is regarded as being justified between himself and the defendant in
relying upon the safe condition of the thing which the defendant has supplied
to him. Here, however, the claimant's liability is itself based upon a proof
of duty owed to the person who is injured. The defendant may be the
greater sinner, but the claimant is not without fault. Under an intelligent
contribution system it might well be that justice should require no more
than that the defendant should bear the greater part of the loss, the claim-
ant bearing only a minor proportion of it. However, contribution being
generally impossible, indemnity in toto has been allowed.
The situation in question is where the defendant has sold or otherwise
supplied to a claimant a tool or instrumentality which is either to be turned
over by him to third persons for their use or to be used by him in a manner
in which the safety of third persons is involved.18 The most usual instance
of this is where the tool or appliance is sold to the claimant who has bought
leHeimer v. Salisbury, 108 Conn. 180, 142 Atl. 749 (1928) ; Edberg v. Johnson, 149
Minn. 395, 184 N. W. 12 (1921); see Lineberger v. City of Greenville, 178 S. C. 47,
182 S. E. 101, 103 (1935). Contra: Swoboda v. Brown, 129 Ohio St. 512, 196 N. E.
274 (1935).
"Matter of Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 250 N. Y. 14, 164 N. E. 726 (1928)
semble per Cardozo, C.J.; and see Vandell v. Sanders, 85 N. H. 143, 155 Atl. 193
(1931) per Branch, J.
"In Aberdeen Construction Co. v. Aberdeen, 84 Wash. 429, 147 P. 2 (1915), in-
demnity was allowed in a case in which a contractor was held liable in following the
plans which the engineer of the defendant had directed' him to follow. The court
properly recognized no difference between the supplying of a tool which, though defective,
the claimant, as between himself and the supplier, was justified in believing safe and the
provision of plans which by the claimant's contract he had bound himself to follow and
which he followed in reliance upon the competence of the defendant's engineer.
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it for the purpose of supplying it to his employees for their use in the course
of his business. If, through the negligence of the vendor as maker or of the
supplier as such, the tool or appliance is dangerous for the use for which
it is sold or supplied, the master, who in reliance upon the care or com-
petence of the maker or supplier fails to make an inspection which it is his
duty to his employees to make and thus renders himself liable for his em-
ployee's injury, is entitled to indemnity.19 If the tool or appliance is sold
to the master, there is usually an express or implied warranty which entitles
him, as vendee, to rely upon its fitness and, where such warranty exists, the
right of indemnity is usually asserted in an action upon it.
In the leading case in this particular situation, the defendant argued that
the claimant was precluded from recovery upon a warranty because his lia-
bility to his servant was based upon his negligent failure to make an inspection
which would have disclosed the dangerous character of the appliance and
thus prevented the injury. Here, as in all similar cases, it was held that,
whatever might be the duty that the claimant owed to his servant, the plaintiff
was under no duty as between himself and defendant as vendor to show his
distrust in the warranty by making the investigation.20  There are, however,
many cases, of which M~owbray v. Merryweather21 is typical, in which indem-
nity has been allowed, although the defendant was not a vendor and, there-
fore, there could be no warranty in the strict technical sense. In that case,
the defendant in pursuance of his contract to afford facilities for the unload-
ing of a particular vessel supplied a chain for the temporary use of the
stevedores employed by the plaintiff. The contract expressly provided that
the facilities should be safe. It was held that the plaintiff, though required
by the Employers' Liability Act then in force to inspect the appliance before
allowing his stevedores to use it, was entitled to recover against the defend-
ant the amount which he had paid in satisfaction of a claim of an employee
injured because of the dangerously defective character of the appliance. As
in other similar cases 22 in which the defendant was not a vendor and where,
therefore, there could be no true implied warranty of fitness, the court speaks
'Mallory S.S. Co. v. DruhanW 17 Ala. App. 365, 84 So. 874 (1920); Pa. Co. v.
Roberts & Schaefer Co., 250 Ill. App. 330 (1928) ; The Pullman Co. v. Cincinnati etc.
R.R., 147 Ky. 498, 144 S. W. 385 (1912); Boston Woven Hose Co. v. Kendall, 178
Mass. 232, 59 N. E. 657 (1901) ; Busch & Latta Painting Co. v. Woermann Const. Co.,
310 Mo. 419, 276 S. W. 614 (1925); Lord & Taylor v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 230
N. Y. 132, 129 N. E. 346 (1920) ; cf. Pa. Steel Co. v. Wash. etc. Bridge Co., 194 Fed.
1011 (D. C. N. D. 1912); Miller v. N. Y. Oil Co., 34 Wyo. 272, 243 Pac. 118 (1926)
(claimant, apartment-house owner, held entitled to indemnity for sum paid to adminis-
trator of tenant asphyxiated in the bathroom of the apartment house as a result of a gas
heater defectively installed by the defendant).
'Boston Woven Hose Co. v. Kendall, 178 Mass. 232, 59 N. E. 657 (1901), per
Holmes, C.J.
2L. R. [1895] 1 Q. B. 857.
'See, for example, Mallory S.S. Co. v. Druhan, 17 Ala. App. 365, 84 So. 874 (1920).
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in terms of warranty. It is obvious, however, that the word "warranty" is
used, not as connoting a technical or "true" warranty, but only as indicating
that the plaintiff because of the contract was as fully entitled to rely upon the
safety of the appliance as though it had been procured by a sale and, there-
fore, by implication had been warranted as fit.
While in Mowbray v. Merryweather23 the contract expressly provided for
the supplying of a safe appliance, there are cases in which it does not appear
that there was anything in the contract or other arrangement in pursuance
of which the appliance was supplied which specifically called for safety.
Even here, the tendency is to speak of the mere supplying of instrumentali-
ties for a particular use as carrying with it an implied warranty that they
were safe for the employee's use.24  Here again, the so-called implication of
this warranty is merely a convenient way of saying, in a form which appears
to justify the granting of indemnity, that the claimant, as between himself
and the defendant, is entitled to rely upon the latter's care and competence
and that he, therefore, cannot complain that no inspection was made, even
though as between the claimant and his employees his failure to inspect was
actionable negligence.
It has been suggested that the allowance of indemnity in such cases may
be accounted for on the ground upon which the right of indemnity is some-
times said to be determined, namely, a distinction between active and
passive misconduct. 25  The creation of the instrumentalityi is active. Its
negligent creator, therefore, is an active wrongdoer. The defendant's negli-
gence lies merely in not doing what he should and is, therefore, passive.
Apart from all else, this is not entirely satisfactory. The claimant's negli-
gence does not consist in his failing to inspect, but in supplying the tool to
his workmen without inspection, and giving the tool to his workmen is as
much active conduct as the creation of a defective machine. There are,
however, cases in which the defendant's fault was identical with that of the
plaintiff, i.e., failure to discover by inspection the defect in an article which
the defendant had procured from a third person or which deterioration had
caused in a properly made article. 26 It is certain that the right to indemnity
cannot be based upon any analogy to the doctrines of last clear chance or
2L. R. [1895) 1 Q. B. 857.
'Boston Rubber Co. v. Kendall, 178 Mass. 232, 59 N. E. 657 (1901) ; Busch & Latta
Painting Co. v. Woermann Const. Co., 310 Mo. 419, 276 S. W. 614 (1925); ef. Wana-
maker Inc. v. Otis El. Co., 228 N. Y. 192, 126 N. E. 718 (1920); Otis El. Co. v.
Cameron, 205 S. W. 852 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
'This was also advanced as a reason for allowing indemnity in Mallory S.S. Co. v.
Druhan, 17 Ala. App. 365, 84 So. 874 (1920). And cf. Ga. Power Co. v. Bainning
Cotton Mills, 42 Ga. App. 671, 157 S. E. 523 (1931). See cases cited in Leflar, Con-
tribution and Indemnity between Tortfeasors (1932) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 130, 155.
'This was so in Mowbray v. Merryweather, supra note 23, and in Mallory S.S. Co. v.
Druhan, supra note 25.
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contributory negligence. It is obvious that the claimant and not the defend-
ant bad the last clear chance to avoid the accident by inspecting the article
after it had come into his hands and before it had been turned over to his
employees. Justifiable reliance is left as the soundest ground upon which the
right to indemnity can be placed.
In many situations duties are imposed the purpose of which is to provide
an additional protection against the known foreseeable misconduct of third
persons. These duties have at least some analogy to the liability of an
endorser upon commercial paper.2 Often the purpose is not merely to give
protection against injury but also to give a reasonable assurance of compen-
sation in the event that injury is not prevented. 28
In the most usual of these situations, the claimant's liability, upon which
the injured third person has recovered judgment against him, is based upon
his failure to remove a dangerous condition of which he knows or which he
should have discovered. The cases are of two types. In the first, the de-
fendant has made a structure, abutting upon a public highway or contiguous
to the land of third persons, so dangerous as to require the claimant as its
owner or possessor to exercise care to put it in safe repair or, if this cannot
be done, to demolish it. In such case the possessor, whose fault lies in not
discovering or removing the dangerous condition created or permitted to
continue by the defendant, may recover indemnity against him for any
damages which his negligent failure to make the necessary repairs has forced
him to pay.29 The second case arises where a municipality has made itself
liable to the injured person by failing to repair a dangerous condition in a
highway of whi'ch it knows or which it should have discovered, the danger-
ous condition having been created by the defendant or having been allowed
to continue by reason of the defendant's failure to perform his duty of remov-
ing it or otherwise making it safe.30 In the great majority of cases of this
=
1The analogy is not complete since one injured by their breach is not required to
pursue his remedy against the third person who had created the dangerous condition
before seeking redress from him whose duty it was to give protection against injury from
such misconducts. Brookville Boro v. Arthurs, 152 Pa. 334, 340 (1893).
2In several of the cases which impose liability upon municipalities for their failure to
remove dangerous defects in highways created by third persons, one of the reasons
given for imposing liability is the superiority of their financial responsibility to that of
those who are responsible for the creation or the persistence of the dangerous conditions.
Albrittin v. Mayor and Alderman of Huntsville, 60 Ala. 486 (1877) ; Clarke v. City of
Richmond, 83 Va. 355, 5 S. E. 369 (1888) ; Sutton v. City of Snohomish, 11 Wash. 24,
39 Pac. 273 (1895).
2'The Westfield Gas & Mill. Co. v. The Noblesville & E. Gravel Rd. Co., 13 Ind. App.
481, 41 N. E. 955 (1895); Gray v. Boston Gas Light Co., 114 Mass. 149 (1873);
Churchill et al. v. Holt, 127 Mass. 165 (1879) ; Scott v. Curtis, 195 N. Y. 424, 88 N. E.
794 (1909) ; Orth v. Consumers Gas Co., 280 Pa. 118, 124 Atl. 296 (1924) ; cf. Derry
El. Co. v. N. E. Tel. & Tel. Co., 31 F. (2d) 51 (C. C. A. 1st 1929) ; Phila Co. v. Traction
Co., 165 Pa. 456, 30 Atl. 934 (1894).
'Washington Gaslight Co. v. D. of C., 161 U. S. 316, 16 Sup. Ct. 564 (1895) ; City of
Des Moines v. Des Moines Water Co., 188 Conn. 24, 175 N. W. 821 (1920) ; City of
CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS
sort, the defendant has created the dangerous condition which the claimant
has been negligent in failing to make safe. In such cases the right to indem-
nity might, and sometimes is, explained on the ground that the claimant's
negligence is "passive," and that of the defendant "active."' 1
There are, however, exceptional cases in which the negligence of both is
equally "passive," both having failed to observe and remedy a defect created
by the innocent or guilty act of some third person, or even by some force,
such as a force of nature, for whose operation no one can be held legally.re-
sponsible. The most salient exhibition of this arises out of the peculiar Penn-
sylvania doctrine which puts upon a possessor of land abutting upon a public
highway the duty to exercise care to discover and repair defects in the side-
walk, though not in the driveway, no matter how created.3 2  In such case,
the delinquent possessor, 'if forced to pay damages, can in Pennsylvania re-
cover indemnity against the creator of the dangerous condition ;33 and the
municipality may recover over any damages which it has been forced to pay,
either from the possessor" or the creator of the danger.3 5  Here, the negli-
gence of both municipality and possessor is "passive." Neither has created
the dangerous condition; both have failed to perform their duty of removal.
Recovery, therefore, cannot be put upon any pre-eminence of liability of the
"active" over the "passive" wrongdoer. Recourse must be had to the idea
of primary and secondary obligation and, therefore, primary and secondary
liability.30
Another field in which indemnity may be properly allowed on the ground
that the liability of the claimant is secondary, that of the defendant primary,
is where the claimant stands in some relation to the injured third person
Topeka v. Central Sash & Door Co., 47 Kan. 219, 154 Pac. 232 (1916); Danzelmier v.
Union Light, Heat, & Power Co., 217 Ky. 186, 289 S. W. 378 (1926); Inhabitants of
Woburn v. Henshaw, 101 Mass. 193 (1869); Bruder v. Phila., 302 Pa. 378, 153 Atl.
725 (1931).
'See, for example, City of Astoria v. Astoria & Col. R.R., 67 Ore. 538, 136 Pac. 645
(1913) ; City of Spokane v. Crane Co., 98 Wash. 49, 167 Pac. 63 (1917) ; and similar
language may be found in S. W. Bell Tel. Co. v. East Texas Pub. Ser. Co., 48 F. (2d)
23, 26 (C. C. A. 5th 1931).
'Thus, in Schlippert v. Orth, 75 Pa. Super. 572 (1921), the court sustained a verdict
and judgment against the abutting owner in favor of a pedestrian injured by the collapse
of a sidewalk. The owner, who had paid the judgment, then recovered over against the
gas company whose negligent explosion caused the sidewalk to subside.
'Orth v. Consumers Gas Co., 280 Pa. 118, 124 Atl. 296 (1924); Wise Shoe Co. v.
Blatt, 107 Pa. Super. 473, 64 Atl. 89 (1933).
"Phila v. Reading Co., 295 Pa. 183, 145 Atl. 65 (1929).
'See Homestead Boro. v. Lumber Co., 47 Pa. Super. 500, 502 (1911).
'The secondary character of the municipality's liability (in Pennsylvania it might
be called the tertiary, .the liability of the creator of the dangerous condition being pri-
mary, that of the possessor of the land abutting upon the sidewalk being secondary)
may possibly be explained on some more or less undefined idea of public policy intended
to relieve the city of the financial burden of maintaining its sidewalks free from defects
for the existence of which others are legally responsible.
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which imposes upon him a duty of protection against the wrongful conduct
of the defendant. Where, as is often the case, the claimant's duty is to pro-
tect the third person from harm which the defendant knows or should know
is then threatened by the conduct of the defendant, the analogy to the situa-
tion last discussed is obvious. In most instances, misconduct against which
it is the claimant's duty to protect the third person is intentionally aggres-
sive. The right to indemnity in such situations rarely, if ever, comes before
courts for decision. Those who commit intentional acts of aggression upon
persons entitled to another's protection are seldom in such a financial posi-
tion as to make it worthwhile to claim indemnity against them. However,
cases may be imagined in which this would not be so. Assume that the
Pullman Company is held liable to a female passenger whom its conductor
has not protected against the indignities of a drunken, but wealthy, fellow
passenger. Is it conceivable that the company having paid the damages
claimed by the female passenger would not be given indemnity from the
drunken ruffian who had insulted her ?37
A somewhat different and more difficult situation is presented where the
claimant's duty is not to afford an opportunity for the commission of merely
probable and injurious misconduct. While in this field there is very little
authority, it seems reasonably safe to assume that the right to indemnity
will depend principally upon the following factors: First, the gravity of the
misconduct of the plaintiff in affording the opportunity, as compared with
that of the defendant who has intentionally utilized or negligently abused
it to the third person's injury; second, and this also has some relation to the
gravity of the misconduct of the two, the extent of likelihood that the oppor-
tunity, if given, will be utilized or abused. The decisions under the work-
man's compensation acts, which are in force in the majority of American
jurisdictions, are fairly unanimous in holding that an employee injured by
a work accident is entitled to compensation from his employer for any in-
crease in his disability which results from the negligent manner in which his
injuries are treated by a physician or surgeon, even though employed by the
workman himself and not by his employer.38 In such case, the employer is
generally held entitled to indemnity from the physician or surgeon to the
extent that his compensation liability is increased by their negligence. 89 It
'Cf. Grand Trunk Ry. v. Latham, 63 Me. 177 (1874), where the claimant railroad
was held entitled to indemnity from the defendant, its conductor, who abused a pas-
senger.
'Dringwitz v. Lincoln Park Coal & Brick Co., 317 Ill. 302, 148 N. E. 79 (1925);
Oleszek v. Ford Motor Co., 217 Mich. 318, 186 N. W. 319 (1922) ; see Matter of Par-
chefsky v. Kroll Bros., Inc., 267 N. Y. 410, 196 N. E. 308 (1935) ; Leidy, Malpractice
Actions and Compensation Acts (1931) 29 MIcH. L. R. 568, 570.
"Overbeck v. Nex, 261 Mich. 156, 246 N. W. 196 (1933); Fisher v. Milwaukee El.
Ry. & Light Co., 173 Wis. 57, 180 N. W. 269 (1920); see Revell v. McCaughan, 162
Tenn. 532 (1930) ; Williams v. Dale, 139 Ore. 105, 8 P. (2d) 578 (1932).
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would seem that the same should be true in those jurisdictions40 in which a
negligent defendant is held (and, it is submitted, properly so) liable for a
similar aggravation of the plaintiff's injuries. It may be just and proper
to hold that the defendant, whose negligence has forced the plaintiff to take
the risk of medical or surgical treatment, should answer for any aggravation
caused by negligence therein. However, the risk is slight. It is not the risk,
or even one of the risks, which makes the conduct which causes the injury
negligent. The fault of the physician or surgeon is, as between the
two, by far the more culpable. Here, imparity of delict should be enough
to give the right to indemnity.
In the absence of authority, it is submitted that the same considerations
may well determine the right of an owner of an automobile to recover indem-
nity from one to whom he lends his car and who by his careless driving
has brought liability upon the owner, even though that liability is not based
upon a statute,41 but solely upon the impropriety of-the owner's entrusting
his car to a driver who to his knowledge may drive it dangerously. If the
reason which makes it improper for the owner to permit the particular driver
to drive his car is one which makes an accident highly likely, as where the
car is lent to an already drunken driver, it may well be that his giving
permission should be held so wrongful and so substantial a factor in bringing
about the resulting accident that the owner should not be permitted to shift
the burden of his liability to the drunken driver. So too, it may well be
that indemnity should be denied where the impropriety of entrusting the car
to the driver in question lies in his known tendency to drive recklessly, par-
ticularly where his reckless character has been officially declared by the
revocation of his license. On the other hand, where the impropriety of per-
mitting the other to drive a car is merely technical, and not due to any par-
ticular likelihood that he will drive it dangerously, it may well be that indem-
nity should be permitted. There seems no reason to deny indemnity where
the car is lent to a person who has carelessly failed to have his license
renewed, or who has a license valid in the state of his domicile but not valid
in the state in which he is permitted to drive, or where the driver, though
experienced and careful, falls a few days or weeks short of the age at which
he would become eligible for a license.
It is safe to assume that where the sole misconduct of the plaintiff was his
failure to take precautions against the possible misconduct, the fact that the
defendant has deliberately and criminally abused the opportunity thus af-
forded him would be enough to require the claimant to indemnify him. Such
'OCray v. Boston El. Ry., 215 Mass. 143, 102 N. E. 71 (1913) ; and see cases collected
in BOHLEN, CASES ON TORTS (3d ed. 1930) p. 283.
'Supra note 40.
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
cases rarely come before the courts for decision. Persons who criminally
abuse an opportunity, negligently given, are rarely worth suit. Here, again,
it is possible to imagine a situation in which the justice of allowing com-
pensation seems obvious. If a collector of Chinese objets d'art were to lend
a valuable collection of jade to a loan exhibition, is it conceivable that the
company giving the exhibition, if forced to pay the collector the cost of its
carelessness in guarding the treasures entrusted to it, should not recover
indemnity from an unscrupulous rival collector who had stolen the jade
while in its custody?
The principal authority for the view that the negligence of the defendant
against whom indemnity is sought must be different in kind from that of the
claimant and not merely prior in time of commission is the case of Union
Stockyards Co. v. Chicago etc. R. R.42 The great authority of the Court has
led to an undue acceptance of the view that "active" negligence in creation of
the dangerous condition on the part of the defendant and "passive" negli-
gence on the part of the claimant in failing to discover the danger are essen-
tial to indemnity.4 3 The case is a peculiar one in that the point principally
argued was whether the defendant in the indemnity proceedings was under
any liability to the person whose valid claim the claimant had satisfied. The
defendant was an initial carrier which had routed a carload of freight for
through transportation over its own and the claimant's line: Through lack
of that careful inspection, which it is admittedly the defendant's duty to
make for the protection of its own employees and which it was contended
that it should have made for the protection of the train men of the connect-
ing carrier, the car was turned over to the connecting carrier in a condi-
tion which made it dangerous for its train crew to handle. The claimant,
the connecting carrier, failed to inspect the car, and while the car was
being transported on its line, the dangerous defect, which an adequate
inspection would have discovered, took effect in injury to one of the train
men whose claim the claimant satisfied. In support and denial of the
defendant's liability to the injured train man, two cases were cited on
each side.44 The Court avoided the necessity- of deciding between these
two conflicting lines of decision by holding that there could be no
"196 U. S. 217, 25 Sup. Ct. 226 (1904).
'See cases cited in Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity between Tortfeasors (1932)
81 U. oF PA. L. REv. 130, 155.
"Moon v. N. Pac. R. R., 46 Minn. 106, 48 N. W. 679 (1891), and Pa. R. R. v.
Snyder, 55 Ohio St. 342, 45 N. E. 559 (1896), holding the forwarding company liable to
receiving company's employee; and Glynn v. Central R. R., 175 Mass. 510, 56 N. E.
698 (1900), and M. K. & T. R. R. v. Merrill, 65 Kan. 436, 70 Pac. 358 (1902), hold-
ing that, since the car after coming into the hands of the receiving company and before
it had reached the place of the accident had crossed a point at which it should have been
inspected, the liability of the delivering company for the defect in the car, which ought
to have been discovered upon inspection by the receiving company, was at an end.
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right to indemnity unless the liability of the defendant was primar7 and
that of'the claimant secondary and that since the fault of the two was of
the same general character, namely, a failure to make an inspection, the
mere fact that the negligence of the defendant preceded that of the plaintiff
gave the defendant's liability no primacy over that of the plaintiff.4 5 If
there is any explanation for this case and it is not to be taken merely as a
decision out of line with the prevailing current of authority, it must rest
upon some peculiar custom in the railroad world or upon the fact that con-
necting carriers do not feel entitled to assume that the cars received by them
from other carriers are in a safe condition. Perhaps the two reasons may
be said to coalesce and form part of a larger whole. The invariable prac-
tice of connecting carriers to subject the rolling stock turned over to them
by other roads to an intensive inspection before forwarding them would
indicate that they do not feel entitled to rely upon such inspections as are
made en route to a connecting point or immediately before the cars are
turned over to them.
In a few isolated cases, of which Nashua Iron and Steel Co. v. The R. R.
Co.,4Q is the most conspicuous instance, indemnity is given where one of two
negligent tortfeasors had the last clear chance to avert the accident which
caused injury to third person. Justice Carpenter, who delivered the opinion
of the court in the New Hampshire case, justified the last clear chance doc-
trine on the ground that the negligence of the plaintiff which had put him in
helpless peril, while it might have been regarded as wrongful as between
him and the person injured, was innocent as between him and the defendant
who, after knowledge of his helpless peril, might have averted the accident
and on the further ground that the negligence of the defendant who had the
last clear chance to avert the accident was, as between himself and the
plaintiff, to be regarded as its sole cause. If these were the actual reasons
for that doctrine, there would be logic in the Court's position that if the
claimant suing for his own injury can recover against the defendant he
should also recover indemnity for any sum which he has been forced to pay
'The car in question was not owned by the defendant. It appears to have been owned
by the consignor. In a sense, therefore, the defendant was a bailee of the car in ques-
tion, and it has been suggested that the decision indicates that a distinction is to be
drawn between those persons who are bailees of the tools which they supply to a master
for the use of his servants and those suppliers who own the tools in question. This
point was not discussed in the Stockyards case nor in the cases allowing indemnity from
the suppliers of dangerously defective instrumentalities. The reason given is quite dif-
ferent and equally applicable to originally well-constructed cars owned by the defendant
which fall into bad condition while in the course of the transportation to the connecting
point. Since the liability rests upon the reasonable reliance of the master upon the safe
condition of the tool supplied to him, there seems no good reason to make the justifica-
tion for reliance depend upon the supplier's ownership of the tool.
"62 N. H. 159 (1882).
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to a third person. If, on the other hand, the last clear chance doctrine is
recognized as a device by which the rigor of the doctrine, which denies
recovery to a plaintiff himself guilty of negligence contributing to his injury,
can be modified so as to give a right of recovery where the plaintiff's help-
lessness and the defendant's misconduct after its discovery so appeals to the
sympathies of the court as to lead it to find a semblance of difference in
fault, the right of indemnity ceases to be a logical deduction from the last
clear chance doctrine. This is particularly true where that doctrine is
extended to cases where the defendant does not know of the plaintiff's help-
less peril, but could have discovered it in time to avert the accident had he
exercised that vigilance which his duty to the plaintiff required. It is even
less possible to regard the defendant as so much the greater sinner as to
require him to indemnify the plaintiff for any sum which he has been forced
to pay to the injured third person, where the humanitarian doctrine is in
-4ogue and an inattentive plaintiff is entitled to recover from the no more
inattentive defendant, or where the defendant's lack of careful preparation
makes him liable to an inattentive plaintiff whom he has done all in his power
to save from injury. Whatever may be said for the logical propriety of
the decision in the Nashua Iron and Steel Company case, one thing is certain.
It is absolutely inconsistent with the allowance of indemnity in two of the
situations in which it is most commonly granted.
Where a dangerously defective tool is supplied to a master who, in reli-
ance upon the care and competence of the supplier, turns it over to his
employees for their use without making that inspection which, as between
himself and them, he should make, the very fact that the tool has passed
into the possession of the master makes the supplier incapable of curing
the defect.4 7  On the other hand, the master's performance of his duty
of inspection would have discovered the defective character of the article and
thus prevented its injurious use. It is obvious that here the master has the
last clear chance to avert the injury under any varient of the last clear
chance doctrine, including that pseudo-varient which is called the humani-
tarian doctrine. The same is true in the innumerable cases in which a
municipality has been permitted to recover from one who has created a
dangerous defect in a public highway or who has wrongfully permitted its
continuance. 48  The municipality often has the sole ability lawfully to re-
move the obstruction. Even where the person creating the defect is able to
discover and remedy it, the ability of the municipality coexists. The creator
of the danger has not that exclusive capacity to avert the harmful effects of
4Supra note 45.
'Supra note 45.
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the defective condition which, except under the humanitarian rule, is the very
hallmark of the liability under the last clear chance doctrine.
It is not surprising to find that, outside of New Hampshire, the Nashua
Iron and Steel Company case has no substantial following. The only case in
which it is expressly followed under circumstances which require its applica-
tion to justify indemnity is the Colorado case of C. & S. 1?. R. Co. v. W.
L. & P. Co. 49 A careful reading of that case, however, leads one to wonder
how the court could have regarded the defendant as having the last clear
chance even under the most liberal extension of that doctrine. 50
There is one situation in which the right to indemnity has been occa-
sionally recognized. That is where the claimant has turned over a structure
or appliance to the defendant in a dangerous condition under circumstances
which would make him liable for any harm which its use by the defendant
in ignorance of its condition might cause to third persons, but where the
defective condition is disclosed to the defendant or otherwise known to him
and the injury is, therefore, due to his use of it with knowledge of the danger
involved therein. These cases are rare since the fact that the person to
whom the structure or chattel is supplied knows of its dangerous condition in
the majority of jurisdictions is sufficient to relieve the supplier of liability. 1
Assuming that the claimant was liable and, therefore, his payment was made
under the compulsion of a liability in which the defendant shared, there seems
no good reason to deny indemnity. The defendant's conduct is something
more than negligent. He does not, perhaps, expect that a third person will
be injured, but he deliberately creates a grave risk of causing serious injury
which could be removed by disclosing the danger of which he, the defendant,
"73 Colo. 107, 214 Pac. 30 (1923).
Two other cases are cited by Leflar in Contribution and Indemnity between Tort-
fcasors (1932) 31 U. OF PA. L. REV. 153, in support of his argument that indemnity
should be granted against a defendant who had the last clear chance of averting the
accident in which the third person was injured. Austin Elec. Ry. v. Faust, 63 Tex.
Civ. App. 91, 133 S. W. 449 (1911), and Weatherford Water, Light, etc. Co. v. Veit,
196 S. W. 98 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917). In both of these cases, the indemnity was
granted solely because the negligence of the defendant was "active" and that of the
plaintiff "passive." It may be that Professor Leflar is right in thinking that, "the
distinction between passivity and activity is a wholly indistinct one," but nonetheless
the distinction is one which has become firmly established as controlling in the Texas
cases. Therefore, the fact that the same result mght have been reached by applying
the analogy of the fast clear chance doctrine is not enough to make these cases authority
for the adoption of this analogy.
'The difficulty in such case is to find a rule of law under which such a claimant
would be liable to the third person. In the great majority of jurisdictions such con-
duct on the defendant's part would ordiniarily be regarded as so extraordinary that
under one theory or another it would relieve the defendant from liability. Since there
can be no right to indemnity except for such sums as were paid to relieve the claim-
ant from a liability to which he was, in fact, subject, the claimant's payment would be
unnecessary and, therefore, he could not recover indemnity for it, although every other
condition was satisfied.
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himself knows. His conduct approaches, if it does not attain, the quality
of recklessness. While mere imparity of delict may not be sufficient, and
certainly no distinction should be drawn between "active" and "passive"
misconduct, the fault of the defendant is so close to one of intention that it
may be well regarded as different in kind, and not only in degree, from that of
the plaintiff, and so make it proper to make the defendant bear the entire loss
which his recklessness has brought upon the third person. This may seem
to have some analogy to an attentuation of the last clear chance doctrine.
However, the analogy, if any, is to those cases in which contributory negli-
gence is held to be no bar where the conduct of the defendant is the deliberate
subjection of the plaintiff to a risk of serious injury and, as such, is in cus-
tomary legal parlance said to constitute "wanton", "wilful", or "reckless" mis-
conduct, to recovery for which contributory negligence is not a bar.
In all of the cases, setting aside the cases where a claimant himself inno-
cent is vicariously liable for the defendant's misconduct, and where the claim-
ant relies upon the defendant's power to give him a privilege which pro-
tects him from liability for intentional conduct otherwise unlawful and a
few other sporadic situations, the allowance of indemnity, by which the
whole of the burden of answering for the harm caused to a third person
by tortious conduct of the two is placed upon the defendant-company, is jus-
tified only by the traditional denial of contribution between joint or co-
tortfeasors. Had this taboo not existed, justice would have been satisfied
by a proper apportionment of the burden in accordance with the respective
responsibility, of which culpability is only one element, of the claimant and
defendant. It is perhaps too much to hope that the jurisdictions which, without
the aid of statute have recognized a right to contribution and those, in which
statutes now permit it52 or in which future statutes will permit it, should
re-examine the whole matter of indemnity in the light of their present or
future power to make an equitable adjustment of the burden of answering
for a third person's injury for which two tortfeasors are responsible. An
express provision requiring such treatment will be necessary; and in view of
the immense number of cases which have allowed indemnity, the securing of
the enactment of such a provision seems unattainable.
'See Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity between Tortfeasors (1936) 21 CoRNqx.L
L Q. 552.
